Causal Inference and Perception in the Treatise and First Enquiry: Hume's Anticipation of Modularity

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Jerry Fodor (American philosopher 1935-2017) has described Hume's psychology as "something like the ultimate in nonmodular theories of mind." This is an appealing picture of Hume's program; perception, memory, and causal inference are special cases of topic-neutral principles of association. Against this, there are precursors of modularity in the *Treatise*, the more so in the first *Enquiry*. These works advance key features of cognitive modules– innateness, rapidity, automaticity, encapsulation, and domain-specificity.

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